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Abstract
Are di¤erences in local banking development long lasting? Do they a¤ect long-term economic performance?
I answer these questions by relying on an historical development that occurred in Italian cities during the 15th
century. A sudden change in Catholic doctrine drove the Jews toward money lending. Cities that were hosting
Jewish communities developed complex banking institutions for two reasons: rst, the Jews were the only
people in Italy who were allowed to lend for a prot, and second, the Franciscan reaction to Jewish usury led to
the creation of charity-lending institutions, the Monti di Pietà, that have survived until today and that became
the basis of the Italian banking system. Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, I provide evidence
of (1) extraordinary persistence in the level of banking development across Italian cities and (2) substantial
e¤ects of current local banking development on per-capita income. Additional rm-level analyses suggest that
well-functioning local banks exert large e¤ects on aggregate productivity by reallocating resources toward more
e¢ cient rms. I exploit the expulsion of Jews from the Spanish territories in Italy in 1541 to argue that my
results are not driven by omitted institutional, cultural, or geographical characteristics. In particular, I show
that the di¤erence in current income between cities that hosted Jewish communities and those that did not is
only observed in regions that were not Spanish territories during the 16th century.
JEL: O43, G21, O10
Keywords: Banks, Economic development, Persistence, Jewish demography.
1 Introduction
In recent years, an exciting economic literature has emerged that regards history as one of the main determi-
nants of current economic development. Beginning with the seminal contributions of Acemoglu et al. (2001),
Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1994), and La Porta et al. (1997), a signicant body of empirical literature argues that
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historical events and primarily colonization patterns have had long-lasting e¤ects on institutions1, culture2,
human capital3, and technology4 and, through those channels, ultimately on current domestic living condi-
tions. In this paper, I document another unexplored channel through which history a¤ects current economic
development: the creation and evolution of banks.
The rst question that this paper attempts to answer is whether the level of local banking development
is persistent over time. This question is central to understanding the remarkable persistence in di¤erences in
economic development across countries and regions. Guiso et al. (2008) note that, among European countries,
the correlation of per-capita income between the beginning and the end of the last century is 0.56. Italy
is a typical example of persistent regional economic disparities: the literature on the so-called questione
meridionale, the social and economic backwardness of Southern Italy, dates back to the end of the nineteenth
century. More generally, the correlation of per-capita income of Italian regions between 1891 and 2001 is 0.625.
In this paper, I argue that this correlation can be partially explained by longevous local banks. In par-
ticular, I highlight the extraordinary persistence of the disparities in local banking development across Italian
municipalities over the last four centuries. For instance, cities that hosted Catholic money-lending institutions
in the second half of the sixteenth century continue to have a signicantly higher number of bank branches per
capita and greater credit availability for the private sector today than those that did not. To isolate a causality
channel, I rst research the history of Italian banks and argue that Jewish demography in the early Renaissance
exerted a substantial inuence on the development of local credit markets.
My argument rests on the following premises:
(1) Jews arrived in Rome during the Roman Empire owing to a mass deportation following the Roman
Empires victory over the Judean rebels. Because of commercial reasons, temporary expulsions from Rome,
and, particularly, deportation as slaves, the Jewish residents spread from Rome to the rest of Italy. For centuries,
their religion prevented them from acquiring economic and social prominence in Italy. However, at the end of
the fourteenth century, a sudden change in Catholic doctrine prohibited the Catholics from lending for a prot
but still allowed the Jews to do so.
(2) Cities that hosted a Jewish community developed complex credit markets. These markets developed
1Studies on the e¤ects of history on long-lasting institutions build on an earlier body of literature dating back to North and
Thomas (1973), North (1981), and North (1990). For a complete review, see Nunn (2009).
2See, for instance, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) on the e¤ects of cultural and religious fragmentation on long-run growth;
Alesina et al. (2013) on the e¤ects of the use of the plough on contemporaneous gender roles; and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
on the e¤ects of the slave trade on trust and contemporaneous growth. Extensive research on Italy has studied the origins of social
trust and its e¤ect on economic development (see, for instance, Baneld (1958), Putnam (1993), Guiso et al. (2008), and Durante
(2009)).
3See Botticini and Eckstein (2007) on the e¤ects of changing religious norms on literacy.
4Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) assess the e¤ects of genetic distance on technology di¤usion and development. Comin and Gong
(2010) document the importance of early technology adoption on current economic performance.
5This result is based on estimates obtained by Felice (2005) on the value added produced in Italian regions in 1891.
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for two reasons. First, Jewish communities specialized in the money-lending business. Second, Franciscan
propaganda against usury, which was particularly ferocious during the fteenth century, led to the creation of
charitable loan banks, called Monti di Pietà, that were intended to drive the Jews out of the local nancial
market. The Monti di Pietà were created in cities in which the Jewish minority was most inuential.
(3) While Jewish pawnshops disappeared, the Monti have survived to the present day and gave rise to a
signicant portion of contemporary Italian banks.
Consider, for example, the cities of Ivrea and Chivasso. These two cities have similar demographic histories6
and shared the same rulers for at least eight centuries7. Today, they share the same legislators and courts because
they both belong to the province of Turin. However, Ivrea hosted a Jewish community in 1500 (tourists can
still visit an ancient Jewish cemetery and a synagogue), while Chivasso did not. In 1591, a Monte di Pietà
was created in Ivrea, motivated by the need to protect the Catholic masses from Jewish usury. Although the
Jewish community disappeared at least a century ago, the Monte operated as the primary lending institution
in the city until 1984. Ivrea still has a greater private credit-to-GDP ratio (98 percent versus 42 percent) and
number of bank branches per resident (0.001 versus 0.0006) than Chivasso.
To conduct the analysis in a more systematic manner, I identify Italian cities that had at least ve thousand
citizens before the Italian unication in 1861 (excluding the islands). For those cities, I reconstruct the approx-
imate size of the Jewish population in 1500 and collect data on the local banks beginning in 1470 (the year
of incorporation of the rst Monte) until 1570. Then, using the Jewish demography in 1500 as an exogenous
source of variation, I document the persistence of these local banks until the present.
The exclusion restriction implied by my instrumental variable regression is that (1) conditional on the
controls included in the regression, Jewish demography ve centuries ago has had no e¤ect on contemporary
banks other than through its e¤ect on local credit markets during the Renaissance and that (2) no unobservables
are systematically correlated with Jewish demography ve centuries ago and contemporary local banks. As
I show in greater detail in the next section, the Jews in Italy were a very small minority, segregated from
the rest of the Italian population and living almost exclusively o¤ revenues from money-lending activities.
Nevertheless, if a locational advantage (not captured by the controls) led the Jews to settle in a particular city
and, simultaneously, a¤ected current local banking development, then my instrument will be inappropriate.
Particular geographic, cultural, institutional, and economic characteristics very likely attracted the Jews to
select certain cities rather than others in 1500. To exclude the possibility that these characteristics may
6According to Malanima, they had fewer than 5 thousands residents until the early 19th century. According to the rst Italian
census, in 1861, Ivrea had approximately 6 thousands residents, and Chivasso a few hundred fewer. Today, Ivrea has 23,714
residents, while Chivasso has 23,649.
7During the 13th century, they were both under the rule of Emperor Frederick II, who assigned them to the Marques of
Monferrato. In the 14th century, they came under the rule of House of Savoy where they remained until the unication of Italy.
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have any direct e¤ect on current local banks, I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach based on an historical
counterfactual. Between 1504 and 1541, Jews were completely expelled from the Kingdom of Naples, to which
they would not be allowed to return for three centuries. This event is exogenous with respect to the Italian
social and economic situation of that period. This event was, in fact, the result of the attitude of the Spanish
crown toward the Jews: the edict was promulgated in Spain in 1493; in 1503, a large part of Italy fell, for
dynastic reasons, under the Spanish crown, and the edict of expulsion also applied in these areas. I establish
that, once a set of observed geographical characteristics are controlled for, no within-province di¤erence in the
level of current economic development (or local banking development) exists between those municipalities that
previously hosted Jewish communities and those that did not in the areas that were once part of the Kingdom
of Naples. However, large within-province di¤erences are observed in those areas from which Jews were not
expelled: in these areas, cities that formerly hosted Jewish communities currently have larger per-capita GDP
(and credit-to-GDP ratios). I interpret this result to indicate that no unobservables a¤ect both the presence of
Jewish communities in 1500 and contemporary local banking and economic development.
Having established the validity of my instrument, I can use it to estimate the persistence of credit institu-
tions. The results are surprising: having hosted a Monte di Pietà during the Renaissance results in a current
increase in credit availability to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP) of at least 80 percent and an
increase in branch density of 24 percent.
The second central question that this paper attempts to answer is whether banks a¤ect long-term economic
performance. Economic theory is divided on this topic. A large body of literature dating back to Schumpeter
emphasizes the positive inuence of the development of a countrys nancial sector on the level and rate of
growth in its per-capita income. The main argument is that nancial intermediaries reduce the cost of acquiring
information and allow for improved assessment, selection, and monitoring of investment projects. For example,
in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989), the ability of nancial intermediaries to improve information collection
results in an increase in the e¢ ciency of resource allocation and, hence, in economic performance8. However,
according to certain theoretical contributions (for example, Bencivenga and Smith (1991); King and Levine
(1993b)), an improvement in the reallocation of resources that results in an increase in the return to savings
may actually depress saving rates and compromise future economic growth. Because the theoretical literature
is divided, elucidating the e¤ect of nance on development remains the task of the empirical literature. In the
1990s, beginning with studies by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), a new body of empirical evidence began to
indicate that a positive relationship exists between the level of development achieved by the banking system
and economic performance, at both the national and regional levels. Italy represents a favorable "laboratory"
8See also Diamond (1996).
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for such empirical studies9 for two reasons. First, focusing on Italy allows researchers to isolate the role of
banks in fostering economic performance. The Italian nancial system can be characterized as bank based.
The capitalization of the Italian stock market is low compared with that of most other developed countries,
and Italian rms have traditionally used debt rather than equity to nance their activities. Therefore, banking
development is likely particularly important for Italian rms. Second, considerable spatial diversity exists in
the degree of banking development. Until 1999, competition among Italian banks was dampened by restrictions
on lending and branching across geographical areas. As a result, fundamental di¤erences developed between
the local credit markets of Italian cities. A possible objection to the use of Italy for this purpose is that local
credit market conditions are irrelevant as long as individuals and rms can access markets other than the local
market. However, a growing body of literature shows that distance a¤ects the provision of funds, especially for
small rms (Petersen and Rajan (2002); Bofondi and Gobbi (2004); Lerner (1995)). Moreover, bankers also
regard distance as an important barrier to lending. As Guiso et al. (2004) report, "the president of the Italian
Association of Bankers (ABI) declared in a conference that the bankers rule of thumb is to never lend to a
client located more than three miles from his o¢ ce".
Although a substantial body of empirical literature demonstrates that a strong correlation exists between
banks and development, assessing the direction of causality has proved to be a di¢ cult task10. There is little
9Lucchetti et al. (2001) examine the e¤ect of local bankse¢ ciency on regional economic development. Angelini and Cetorelli
(2003) study the e¤ects of regulatory reforms on bank mark-ups. Bonaccorsi di Patti and DellAriccia (2004) focus on rm creation.
Guiso et al. (2004) present evidence of the e¤ect of local nancial development on a wide set of outcomes, such as business formation,
rm entry, and growth. Guiso et al. (2006) study the e¤ect of banking regulation on the cost of and access to credit. Alessandrini
et al. (2009) present evidence that greater branch density reduces the probability that rms are nancially constrained. Benfratello
et al. (2008) concentrate on the e¤ects of branch density on the probability that rms engage in R&D.
10Four di¤erent approaches have been adopted in this literature.
In a successful contribution, King and Levine (1993a) show that, on a cross-country basis, the predetermined component of
nancial development is a good predictor of growth over the following 10 to 30 years.However, skeptics o¤er two arguments against
the use of this methodology for analyzing causality. First, an omitted variable, such as the propensity of households to save, may
drive both nancial development and economic development. Second, a reverse causality may be a problem with this methodology,
as the typical measures of nancial development (stock market capitalization and the availability of credit to the private sector)
may respond to expected future growth.
The second approach seeks to rule out omitted country-level factors by focusing on interaction e¤ects rather than the primary
e¤ects of nancial development. On a cross-country basis, using industry-level data, Rajan and Zingales (1998) test the hypothesis
that nancial development should disproportionately assist industries that are relatively more dependent on external nance for their
growth. As a proxy for a certain industrys need for external nancing, the authors use data on the di¤erence between investments
and cash ows in the analogous industry in the US. The main problem with this approach is that the results are di¢ cult to interpret
without the following assumptions: all countries share the same technologies and perform the same tasks within each industry and
capital markets in the US are perfect.
The third approach focuses on the time-series dimension and studies the e¤ect of one-time exogenous nancial liberalization. For
example, at the US state level, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) nd that economic growth increases in states that relax intrastate
bank branching restrictions. However, according Fry (1995), the simultaneity of reforms appears to be binding for this type of
study: "Most clear-cut cases of nancial liberalization were accompanied by other economic reforms (such as scal, international
trade and foreign exchange reforms). In such cases it is virtually impossible to isolate the e¤ects of nancial components of the
reform package".
The nal widely applied approach in the literature is the instrumental variable approach. Many authors have used GMM
estimators developed for panel data where the instruments come from the lagged values of a nancial development proxy. Levine
et al. (2000) use data on a panel of 77 countries over the 1960-1995 period. The primary advantage of this methodology is that
it controls for cross-sectional xed e¤ects. However, the procedure is data intensive, and researchers cannot generally rely on long
time series. As Levine (2005) notes: "Levine et al. (2000) employ data averaged over a ve-year period, yet models we are using
to interpret data are typically models of steady state growth. To the extent that ve years do not adequately proxy for long-
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agreement on what determines banking institutions, making it di¢ cult to isolate exogenous sources of variation
and estimate their e¤ects on performance.
Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, I nd that an increase in the current credit availability
of 1 percent increases GDP per capita in Italian municipalities by at least 0.18 percent. The e¤ect of branch
density is even stronger: an increase in the ratio of bank branches to total residents of 1 percent increases
per-capita GDP by at least 0.7 percent. In other words, if a bank "fell from the sky" in a city characterized by
the average branch density and one hundred thousand residents, local GDP per capita would be expected to
increase by 2.8 percent. These estimates support the view that credit institutions have strong positive e¤ects
on economic development. Interestingly, at least 11 percent of the North-South gap in per-capita GDP is
attributable to lower current credit availability, which is due to the expulsion of Jews.
In the last section of the paper, I illuminate a particular channel through which the improvement of credit
institutions a¤ects economic development. The so-called "Schumpeterian view" in the literature on nance
and growth is based on the notion that banking institutions a¤ect economic performance through their ability
to foster aggregate productivity (e.g., the total output produced by the economy for a given set of inputs)
rather than capital accumulation. My results validate this view. An increase in credit availability of 1 percent
increases aggregate productivity by at least 0.05 percent (0.5 percent for branch density). Moreover, I show that
banks a¤ect aggregate productivity through the reallocation of resources toward more productive rms rather
than through an increase in average rm productivity. This nding appears to validate theories emphasizing
the importance of the role of the banks in exploiting ex ante information on investment opportunities to select
the most promising investments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents historical background information on Italian Jewish
communities and the origins of Italian banks. Section 3 highlights the long-term e¤ects of Jewish demography
in 1500 on per-capita income in Italian cities. Section 4 documents (1) the e¤ects of current banks on per-capita
GDP and (2) the persistence of the relative levels of local banking development across Italian municipalities
over the last ve centuries. Section 5 examines the e¤ect of local banks on rm productivity. Some concluding
remarks close the paper.
run relationship, the panel methods may imprecisely assess the nance growth link". To overcome this problem, researchers have
searched for externalinstruments that can explain cross-sectional di¤erences in nancial development without requiring long time
series of data. Levine (1998), Levine (1999), and Levine et al. (2000) use the La Porta et al. (1998) measures of a countrys legal
origins as instruments for current nancial development. This type of analysis has three important drawbacks. First, excluding the
possibility that these instruments a¤ected not only nancial institutions but also other institutions is di¢ cult. For example, the
legal origins of a country a¤ect local contractual institutions. Second, it is di¢ cult to rule out missing geomorphological variables
that could drive both the instrumental and instrumented variables. Third, these studies are generally based on a limited number
of observations.
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2 The Jews in Italy and the Rise of the Monti di Pietà
Jews were already present in Italy in the second century BCE11. The rst large communities were the result of
mass deportations after the Jewish struggle and defeat in Judea at the hands of the Roman Empire12. Bonl
(1991) describes the Jewish communitiesrole in the Roman society accordingly:
The fact that the Jews in Italy were of petty bourgeois or even servile origin and that they
were not infrequently suspected of opposing Roman policy abroad prevented individual Jews from
attaining prominence in economic or social life. [..] They engaged in humble occupations and lived
in the proletarian sections. Cultural standards were not high, although there were painters, actors,
and poets.
Estimates indicate that approximately fty thousand Jews lived in Italy during the rst century. Because of
commercial reasons, temporary expulsions from Rome and, particularly, deportation as slaves, the Jews spread
from Rome to the rest of Italy. Whenever possible, they established themselves in more cosmopolitan cities
where the local population was more tolerant of their religious convictions and customs. For these reasons,
Jewish communities were concentrated in cities with important ports or where commerce was a prominent
activity (Milano (1963), p. 29).
Even after the fall of the Roman Empire, the strong opposition of the Christian Church conned the Jews
to the margins of Italian society. According to Bonl, until the end of the 13th century, Jews remained part
of the petty bourgeoisie and were primarily artisans (especially dyers and silk weavers) and small merchants.
Typically, they owned houses in towns, but occasionally, some Jews also engaged in farming13.
This situation changed dramatically in the 14th century. During this period, Jews in Italy engaged in a new
sphere of economic activity as moneylenders. Three primary motivations drove the Jews toward lending. First,
during the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church, through several Ecclesiastical Councils, banned the practice of
lending to earn a prot14. This prohibition, which had previously been limited to the Catholic clergy, was
11The rst evidence of a Jewish presence in Italy dates back to 168 BCE. A Jewish general, Maccabees, was leading the struggle
to free Palestine from Syrian domination and sent an embassy to Rome asking for military support.
12The rst large wave of Jewish prisoners arrived in Italy in 61 BCE after Pompey and the Roman Empires legions had subjugated
Judea and conquered Jerusalem. In 66 CE, Judea rebelled against the invaders: the war lasted for four years and resulted in the
complete defeat of the Jews. Again, a large portion of the Jewish prisoners were brought to Italy. According to later sources, 1500
Jewish prisoners arrived in Rome alone, and 5000, in Apulia. The last mass deportation of Jewish prisoners in Italy dates back to
134, when the Jewish struggle against the Romans resulted in the wholesale destruction of Jerusalem and more than one thousand
other Jewish towns.
13 In the middle of the thirteenth century, Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote that, unlike in other countries, Jews in Italy earned their
livelihoods through their own work and not moneylending.
14The Christian prohibition against lending for a prot traces its origins to the ancient world and is inspired by two principles.
First, the Aristotelian maxim Pecunia pecuniam parere non potest (money cannot beget money) excluded the possibility that
investing to obtain future prot could be benecial for society. Second, lending for a prot was considered at odds with the principle
Mutuum date nihil inde sperantes (give without hoping to receive anything in return), enunciated in the Gospel according to
Saint Luke.
7
extended to the Catholic laity. Moreover, the Lateran Council of 1215, having forbidden Jews from lending at
high and immoderate interest rates, silently allowed them to lend at normal interest rates. Second, between 1260
and 1340, the Italian peninsula experienced a strong expansion of merchant and craft guilds (Morelli (2008)).
These organizations acquired complete control over the primary economic activities in the largest Italian cities.
Because membership required adherence to Catholicism, a large number of Jews were forced to leave their
traditional occupations. Third, some Jews in Central Italy who had engaged in trade during the Middle Ages
had accumulated sizable fortunes and had both the capital and expertise to become moneylenders15.
Although the ban on Catholic usury did not prevent the rise of a new class of Catholic merchant bankers16,for
more than a century the Jews enjoyed a monopoly in lending to the poor and the middle class. By the
beginning of the 15th century, the geographic expansion of Jewish lending was complete and had become a
general economic phenomenon in all parts of Italy. According to Shulvass (1973), Italian Jews during this
period primarily derived their livelihoods from usury, pawnshops, and lending17. Italian town governments
generally protected the expansion of Jewish lending because Jewish lenders represented an important source
of public revenues18. Thus, several Jewish bankers were able to accumulate small fortunes. A number of Jews
adopted the manners of the gentile upper class, with a taste for arts and letters; this period is remembered
as one of unprecedented prosperity for Italian Jewry. These achievements, however, were undermined by two
factors.
The rst was the attitude of the Spanish Crown of Aragon toward its Jewish subjects. In March 1492,
the Aragonese crown promulgated an edict expelling the Jews from its territories. At that time, Sicily and
15An old thesis, dating back to Jewish historian Cecile Roth, claims that the selection of Jews into moneylending primarily
resulted from restrictions on landownership. Because of these restrictions, Jews abandoned farming and adopted the most protable
profession in urban areas. This thesis, however, has been disputed by a recent historiographic account (see Botticini and Eckstein
2007).
16Merchant banks originated in the Middle Ages, when Italian merchant houses generally small, family-owned, import-export
and commodity-trading businesses began to use their excess capital to nance foreign trade in return for a share of the prots.
Beginning in the 14th century, they extended their business to nancing governments and the currency exchange market. In
particular, the Medici bank in Florence emerged as a merchant-banking powerhouse. At the crux of the success of this bank was
the system of bills of exchange that was used to exchange di¤erent types of currency. The process of a bill of exchange involved
the exchange of money between di¤erent branches of the Medici bank, over the course of several months. The change in exchange
rates at various locations over the length of time that it took to travel with the money allowed the Medici bank to make a prot
without charging interest.
17 In 1320, Kalonymos ben Kalonymos (1286-1328 CE), a Spanish Jewish philosopher, wrote in his Maseket Purim: no usurious
loans are to take place on Purim that is in the land of Israel, but it is permitted in Babylonia and in Greek Italy [...]. Jews of
Babylonia and Italy have nothing else but usury upon which to rely [for their support]. Two centuries later, Jehiel Nisim da
Pisa (1507-1574 CE), a wealthy Italian Jewish banker, also attested that in these lands [Italy] more than everywhere else in the
entire Diaspora has the custom of lending to non-Jew become widespread. Famous rabbis were also moneylenders and, according
to Sonne (1948), most Northern Italian rabbis were bankers, even when they served as the heads of rabbinical schools. Leon da
Modena (1638) charged that in our generation all interest lenders are regarded honorable and not only are they not ineligible to
testify and to judge, it is quite the reverse, namely, their word is as reliable as a hundred of witnesses, they are our leaders and
judges.
18Most Italian governments regulated Jewish lending in their domains through the mechanism of the condotta, a bilateral contract
between the town government and Jewish lenders. Jewish lenders were allowed to engage in this activity in exchange for an annual
tax and the promise to lend (occasionally at favorable terms) to the city government. The charters also regulated the interest-rate
ceiling: in many instances, these ceilings were raised to tax the extra rent Jews realized on their loans (Botticini 2000).
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Sardinia were under Aragonese rule, and thus, the edict also applied there. Then, in 1503, the Kingdom of
Naples (which included all of Southern Italy, the region of Abruzzi and some cities close to Rome)19 came under
the Aragonese crown, and the Jews were expelled from these territories. Opposition to the edict by both the
Christian masses and the local aristocracy led to certain exceptions. In particular, approximately 200 wealthy
families were formally permitted to remain. However, in 1541, these exceptions were abrogated, and the law
excluding Jews from the kingdom remained in force for over three centuries. In 1535, the Duchy of Milan also
came under the Spanish rule20. The expulsion of the Jews from the Duchy was ordered in 1590 and executed
in 1597. In 1683, the Jews were invited to return, but very few families did so.
Meanwhile, the Christian populations of other Italian states voiced increasing opposition to Jewish lending.
According to Shulvass,
The economic depression of the masses caused by endless wars waged throughout all of Italy,
contrasted with a rise in the living standard of Jewish pawnbrokers, aroused strong anti-Jewish
feelings. The movement was led by the Franciscans, who during this period had a number of
outstanding itinerant preachers with tremendous inuence upon the masses. [..] They believed that
the abolition of the Jewish loan business would heal all social ills. The masses also believed that
the loan business was ruining the country.
With the explicit intention of keeping Christians in need of loans away from Jewish moneylenders, Franciscan
leaders such as Bernardino da Siena, Giacomo della Marca, Giovanni da Capistrano, and Bernardino da Feltre
laid the foundations for the Monti di Pietà, lending institutions sponsored by wealthy Christians that would
extend credit on a nonprot basis.
The creation of a Monte di Pietà followed a usual scheme, which is well described by Attilio Milano (1963,
p. 74). A Franciscan preacher would arrive in town and o¤er several sermons to the largest audience possible,
proclaiming that the current misfortune of the townspeople was divine retribution for the continued presence
of Jewish usury; to appease Gods wrath, usury should be eliminated21. An expiatory procession would follow,
during which each member of the community was expected to contribute to the formation of the initial capital
19A detailed map of the Italian states in 1500 can be found in the online appendix (Figure A.1)
20The Spaniards de facto held the Duchy of Milan from 1535 when the duke Francesco II Sforza died without heirs. The French
crown claimed the duchy until 1559, when the possession was nally recognized as Spanish by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis.
21One of the main Franciscan preachers of that time, Bernardino da Siena, depicted Jewish lenders as bloodsuckers. In his sermon
43 on usury, he states: "It is usually the case that when wealth and money are concentrated into fewer and fewer hands and purses,
it is a sign of the deteriorating state of the city and the land. This is similar to when the natural warmth of the body abandons the
extremities and concentrates only in the heart and the internal organs; this is seen as the clearest indication that life is slipping way
and that the person is soon to die. And if this concentration of wealth in the hands of the few is dangerous to the health of the city,
it is even more dangerous when this wealth and money is concentrated and gathered into the hands of the Jews. For in that case,
the natural warmth of the city for this is what its wealth represents is not owing back to the heart to give it assistance but
instead rushes to an abscess in a deadly hemorrhage, since all Jews, especially those who are moneylenders, are the chief enemies
of all Christians."
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of the Monte, typically in exchange for a plenary indulgence. Finally, the Franciscan preacher would assist the
local authorities in drafting the charter for the Monte22.
Several anecdotes regarding the creation of the Monti have survived to the present day. For example,
according to his biographer, in 1470, Bernardino da Feltre arrived in LAquila, a town in Abruzzi, and o¤ered
82 sermons instigating the inhabitants to create a Monte and kill the Jewish minority23. Two weeks later, several
processions and turbulent demonstrations by the population led the city council to authorize the creation of
a Monte di Pietà. Its statute clearly indicates that the Monte was created with the mandate to refrenare la
insatiabele voragine della usura de Judey, la quale devora et consume li beni temporali dellomini et persone de
essa magnica cita dellAquila e so contato(to stop the insatiable bottomless chasm of Jewish usury, which
devours and consumes all the goods owned by the people of the magnicent city of LAquila and its county).
Several days after the establishment of the Monte, the Jews were expelled from the city (although they would
be invited to return two years later).
The connection between the creation of the Monte di Pietà and this anti-Jewish propaganda left traces in
the statutes of the great majority of the Monti di Pietà that were created before the beginning of the 18th
century24.
Numerous papers from both historians and economists on the relationship between Jewish demography
and the rise of the Monti di Pietà during the Italian Renaissance exist in the literature 25. The mainstream
historical perspective can be summarized by the words of Segre (1978):
The mounts rise where there are Jewish bankers and their reason of being and their fuel is the
opposition to the Jewish bankers and, sometimes their destruction under an overwhelming public
pressure.
In the words of Menning (1993):
22The online appendix includes a reproduction of a painting by Sebald Popp, The sermon of the pious Giovanni da Capestrano
in Norimberga(Figure A.2). The painting dates back to 1493 and describes a typical Franciscan predication. You can identify a
Franciscan preacher giving a sermon, the women piling up their best clothes and jewels in front of the preacher (the mount of piety
originally referred to a pile of objects collected for redistribution to the poor), and, on the upper left of the representation, a Jew
being arrested by the local authorities.
23n che glebrei non fosser da glAquilani tagliati a pezzi(until the Jews have been cut into pieces by the inhabitants).
24For example, you can nd references to Jewish usury in the founding statutes of the following lending institutions: Monte di
Pietà di Viterbo (1472): una losca nidiata di ebrei (sinister brood of Jews); Monte di Pietà di Parma (1491): ad evitare le
voragine de le usure de zudei per subventione dei poveri christiani(to avoid the bottomless chasm of Jewish usury by subsidizing
the poor people); Monte di Pietà di Parma (1491): alla iattatura delle usure et massime delli zudi (to the damnation of usury
and, especially, the Jewish one); Monte di Pietà di Rieti (1489): succatori del sangue de li cristiani(suckers of Christian blood);
Monte di Pietà di Cuneo (1557): voragine dellusura di ebrei; Monte di Pietà di Casale (1557): ai giudei che devorano il sangue
de poveri (to the Jews that devour the poors blood); Monte di Pietà di Savigliano (1602): ingorda tirannia degli usurai ebrei
(gluttonous tyranny of Jewish usurers).
25Montanari (1999) o¤ers an excellent collection of studies on the relationship between Jewish demography and the rise of the
Monti di Pietà.
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"As brokers of small loans against pawns, Italian Monti di Pietà were expected not only to
replace Jewish moneylenders but also to set up the conditions in which all Jews could be expelled."
Between 1470 and 1570, the Franciscan preachers created more than two hundred Monti di Pietà in Central
and Northern Italy. However, the lack of a rm business base undermined their stability. They were continuously
dependent on charity to nance their operations, and the lack of any prot motive made them particularly
ine¢ cient. The presence of a Jewish community in the city provided three di¤erent means of solving the
problem. First, the Franciscans continued to use the specter of Jewish usury to promote frequent processions,
where the forgiveness of multiple sins was exchanged for donations to the Monte. Second, the Jews were
frequently forced to pay a tax to the local Monte or to deposit some of the revenues from their money-lending
activities. Finally, in other cases, they provided the initial expertise to establish the Monti. Accordingly, Attilio
Milano (1963, pp. 165) concludes that the co-existence of Monti di Pietà and Jewish pawn banks was not
only possible but also necessary, and for this reason, the Jewish moneylenders who had been expelled after
the creation of the Monti were, in most cases, invited to return.
The Monti di Pietà, which were founded as charity institutions, developed particular features that are
typical of modern banks during the late sixteenth century. In 1515, Pope Leo X allowed them to charge interest
on their loans; in 1560, Pope Pius IV authorized them to accept deposits from private citizens; and nally,
in 1569, Pope Pius V allowed them to remunerate these deposits. However, the Monti continued to primarily
rely on charity and donations to nance their growth until the late seventeenth century, and their endowments
remained relatively low compared with those of Jewish pawnshops. The Monti were only allowed to receive
deposits and to make loans to residents, these loans were limited in size (they could not exceed the average
monthly wage of a peasant) and duration (6 months or 1 year), and their use was bound by rigid moral rules.
Moreover, in periods of general hardship, raising su¢ cient funds was di¢ cult for the Monti, as all of their
donors and depositors resided in a single town. Conversely, Jewish pawnshops could lend much larger sums for
longer periods. Furthermore, through a network of family ties, social relationships, and economic partnerships,
the pawnshops were able to provide access to external sources of credit 26.
The Monti di Pietà were not able to expand their range of activities from consumption credit to production
credit until between the 17th and 18th centuries (De Maddalena (1975), Montanari (1999)). At this point,
the turnover of the Monti di Pietà expanded to an unprecedented degree. Meanwhile, a series of papal edicts
undermined the Jewish pawnshops. The nal defeat of Jewish lenders came in 1682, when Innocent XI banned
their pawnshops from the Papal States. In the three decades that followed, the ban was extended to all Italian
states. While the Italian Jewish money-lending industry eventually disappeared, the Monti were surprisingly
26An interesting discussion on the complementarity between Jewish moneylenders and Monti di Pietà can be found in Botticini
(2000). See also Montanari (1999) (p. 10).
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resilient. By the end of the 19th century, approximately 300 Monti were operating in Italy (Pagliazzi and
Nicosia (1968)).
An obvious question is whether those cities that were unable to rely on Jewish pawnshops or Monti di Pietà
developed alternative means of providing credit that could avoid the interest ban. The answer is yes. First,
interhousehold credit was very popular. As no credit contract could make reference to an interest rate, the
actual payment of interest depended on the good faith of the parties. The legal risk involved in these types of
transactions led to the development of more complex contractual forms in which the loan component was hidden
or not easily identiable. The most popular of these contractual forms by far was the so-called Contratto alla
Voce. In essence, during planting season, the creditor (generally a trader or a large landowner) would pay the
debtor (the peasant) an amount corresponding to the provisional value to purchase part of the farms produce,
which was to be delivered after the harvest and paid for at the price established by the local authorities. The
interest was hidden in the fact that the price decided by the local authorities was generally xed in favor of the
creditor and above the market price (Felloni (2011), Pertile (1895) p.565, Placanica (1982)).
Thus, the situation of Italian credit institutions in 1860, immediately after myriad small states and inde-
pendent cities were unied in the Italian Kingdom, was characterized by local Monti di Pietà, with centuries
of banking experience in those cities that formerly hosted Jewish communities during the early Renaissance,
and ancient, complex contracts designed to conceal interest payments in the other cities. Immediately after
Italian unication, the Italian banking system underwent profound reorganization. The Monti lost some of
their banking prerogatives, while a new type of bank, the Casse di Risparmio, began to dominate local credit
markets. The Casse di Risparmio were generally founded by either individual or groups of local Monti; in very
few cases, they arose outside the auspices of the Monti (Zamagni (2005), Racine (2004)). They shared with the
Monti a nonprot status and an institutional mission to combat usury, but they were able to benet from more
relaxed regulatory legislation: they were allowed to collect deposits indiscriminately from the private sector
and to invest them on an economic rather than a charity basis. Some decades later, following the banking
reform of 1929, the regulatory legislation for the largest Monti di Pietà was assimilated into the legislation
governing the Casse di Risparmio, and the Monti forfeited their original charitable mission. The nal relevant
legislative reform occurred in 1992 (but was only implemented in 1999). Both the Monti di Pietà and the Casse
di Risparmio lost their nonprot status, and they were transformed into joint-stock companies; moreover, their
ownership was transferred to foundations, which continue to operate as nonprot organizations.
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3 Data Description
This paper uses three sets of data: the rst and second include historical and current data, respectively, on
Italian municipalities, while the third includes detailed characteristics of Italian rms.
The rst set of data contains information on demography and local credit markets in Italy during the
Renaissance (islands excluded). Data on historical Jewish demography come from the work of an Italian
scholar, Attilio Milano. His book, "Storia degli Ebrei in Italia" (History of the Jews in Italy, 1963), includes
a map of the Jewish communities in Italy in 1500 CE (the map is reproduced in Figure 1). In particular,
he distinguishes among three types of communities: small (a dozen families), medium (a few dozen families)
and large (several dozen families). These data were collected from several historiographical studies that were
conducted at the regional and municipal levels. The historical urban population data come from Malanima
(1998). Relying heavily on the seminal work on Italian population history by Beloch (1937), Paolo Malanima
compiled a dataset containing urban population estimates for over 500 Italian cities on a centennial basis over
the 1300-1861 period. The sample comprises all Italian cities with an estimated average population of at least
ve thousand inhabitants in the year of Italian unication (1861). Data on the locations of the Monte di Pietà
during the rst century of their existence (1470-1570) are provided by Meneghin (1986), while data on Jewish
pawnshops operating in the same period are provided by Montanari (1999). Table 1a reports the summary
statistics for this set of historical data. The sample comprises 360 cities, of which nearly half previously hosted a
Jewish community. Of the 173 Jewish communities in 1500, over half were small (101), approximately one-third
were medium-sized (47), and the rest were large (25). Nearly one-third of the Italian cities in the sample had
a Monte di Pietà or a Jewish pawnshop operating in their territory. Regarding the urban population data, an
extraordinary decline in urban populations occurred between 1300 and 1400 due to epidemics of the plague.
The second set of data contains current information on Italian municipalities (the data refer to the years
2002-2003). The geomorphological data come from the Italian Geographical Institute De Agostini. Statistics on
population and education levels come from the Italian National Statistical Institute. The value-added data also
come from this source; these data are not available at the city level but rather at the level of the "local labor
system" (LLS) level. This unit is dened on the basis of the Population Census data and comprises a set of
contiguous municipalities with a high degree of self-containment in daily commuter tra¢ c and similar economic
and geographic characteristics. Italy has a total of 854 LLSs, and all cities in my sample are located in distinct
LLSs. In the remainder of my analysis, I will assume that the per-capita GDP of each city is identical to that
of the LLS in which the city is located. Financial data on branch density and private credit come from the
Bank of Italy. Table 1b reports summary statistics for these city-level data. The level of economic development
varies substantially across Italian cities. The wealthiest city has a GDP per capita that is more than eight
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times that of the poorest city. Regarding the nancial data, the private credit to GDP ratio has a surprisingly
large mean (0.71) and standard deviation (0.57). For example, using a sample of 75 countries and a similarly
constructed measure of the private credit to GDP ratio, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) report a mean of 0.4
and a standard deviation of 0.29.
The third dataset contains current information on Italian rms. The main source of information is Amadeus,
a comprehensive rm-level, pan-European database developed by Bureau Van Dijk. For each rm, Amadeus
provides data on the industry in which the rm operates (at the 4-digit NACE level), the location, the year of
incorporation, the ownership structure, and the number of employees, in addition to complete balance sheets and
prot and loss statements. The dataset includes both publicly traded and nontraded companies and accounts
for nearly 90 percent of the sales reported in the national accounting data. To deate rmssales, materials,
intermediates, and capital, I merged this dataset with an industry-level dataset that comprises output and
input prices for industries at roughly the 2-digit level of aggregation from the EU-KLEMS project. Table 1c
reports summary statistics for rmsdeated quantities.
4 Long-Term Persistence
The objective of this section is to establish the causal e¤ect of Jewish demography during the Renaissance on
the current economic performance of Italian municipalities.
The initial premise is that the e¤ect of Jewish communities on the evolution of the Italian banking system
and, through this channel, on local economic development can be represented by the following system of
equations:
JFi = 1J
1500
i +X
0
i1 + 1;i (1)
MPi = 2JFi +X
0
i2 + 2;i (2)
logFi = 3MPi +X
0
i3 + 3;i (3)
log Yi = 4 logFi +X
0
iY + 4;i (4)
where J1500i is a dummy variable that identies cities that previously hosted a Jewish community in 1500;
JFi and MPi identify those cities that hosted Jewish pawnshops and Catholic Monti di Pietà in the following
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century, respectively; Fi measures the current level of local banking development; Yi is per-capita income; and
X 0 is a vector of covariates that a¤ect all variables.
The rst equation captures the fact that, during the Renaissance, the Jews were the only people in Italy
allowed to charge interest and that they derived their livelihoods almost exclusively from revenues from money-
lending. Thus, the presence of a Jewish community was generally associated with the presence of several Jewish
pawnshops in local credit markets. This association is conrmed by the rst four columns of Table 2, which
reports the OLS estimates of equation 1 in the historical Kingdom of Naples (columns 1 and 2) and in the rest
of Italy (columns 3 and 4). While no relationship exists between Jewish demography in 1500 and the presence
of a Jewish pawnshop between 1470 and 1570 for the Kingdom of Naples, which expelled the Jews, the presence
of a Jewish community is associated with an increase in the probability of having a Jewish pawnshop of between
35 and 50 percent (depending on the size of the community) for the rest of Italy. This result is conrmed when
I only exploit variation within Italian provinces (columns 2 and 4).
The second equation reects the mainstream historical perspective on the rise of the Monti di Pietà. The
Monti were created expressly to counteract the inuence of Jewish moneylending. The presence of a Jewish
community not only spurred the creation of the Monte di Pietà but also was necessary for the survival of a
Monte. The Monti were continuously dependent on charity and donations: waving the specter of Jewish usury
was an e¤ective means of raising funds. In the rst century of their activity, 229 Monti di Pietà opened in
Italy, and the great majority of them were located in cities that hosted Jewish communities; only 17 opened
in the Kingdom of Naples, from which the Jewish population had been expelled (where nearly 40 percent of
the Italian urban population was concentrated). Indeed, columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 conrm that cities located
outside the Kingdom of Naples in which a Jewish pawnshop was operating were approximately 50 percent more
likely to host a Monte di Pietà.
The third equation captures the fact that, where the expansion of the Monti di Pietà could benet from a
Jewish presence, the Monti were able to survive until the present day and thus formed the foundation of the
contemporary Italian banking system. In 1995, the largest Italian banks, measured by number of branches in
Southern, Central, and Northern Italy, were Banco di Napoli, Banca di Roma, and San Paolo, respectively.
Banco di Napoli was founded through the merger of eight Catholic institutions that were established in Naples
between 1539 and 164027, while Banca di Roma and San Paolo originate from the Monte di Pietà of Rome 28
27 In 1539, the Monte di Pietà of Napoli was founded with the philanthropic purpose of providing interest-free pawn loans.
Subsequently, the Monte di Pietà opened a depository bank that was recognized with a viceregal proclamation in 1584. Over the
next 50 years, seven other Catholic institutions were founded in Naples: the Sacro Monte e Banco dei Poveri (1600); the Banco Ave
Gratia Plena or Banco della Santissima Annunziata (1587); the Banco di Santa Maria del Popolo (1589); the Banco dello Spirito
Santo (1590); the Banco di SantEligio (1592); the Banco di San Giacomo e Vittoria (1597); and the Banco del Santissimo Salvatore
(1640). These eight banks prospered for over two hundred years until they were merged to create the "Banco Nazionale di Napoli"
in 1794 by Ferdinand IV of Bourbon.
28Banca di Roma regrouped the histories of several notable Rome-based nancial houses. The oldest of these nancial houses
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and the Monte di Pietà of Turin29, respectively. More generally, the great majority of modern Italian banks
trace their origins to the Monti di Pietà that were created during the Renaissance30. Columns 7-10 of Table 2
show that the presence of a Monte di Pietà in a city between 1470 and 1570 is associated with an increase in
the current ratio of private credit to GDP in the municipality of approximately 50 percent and an increase in
branch density of approximately 19 percent (11 percent when province xed e¤ects are controlled for).
The last equation captures the e¤ect that local banks exert on current economic development. The last
two columns of Table 2 show a positive correlation between current credit availability and income per capita in
Italian municipalities: a 1 percent increase in the private credit to GDP ratio (in branch density) is associated
with a 0.1 percent (0.23 percent) increase in per-capita income.
All the results presented in Table 2 are correlations, which do not necessarily indicate causal e¤ects. In
particular, the same local advantages that led the Jews to settle in a particular city may also be responsible
for the presence of Jewish pawnshops and Monti di Pietà in the city during the Renaissance and for the more
developed credit markets and higher levels of per-capita income today. Jewish demography in 1500 was certainly
inuenced by the economic, institutional, cultural, and geographical environment. Controlling for all of these
factors is practically impossible, and the regressions above cannot reject the alternative that these factors are
the ultimate source of persistence.
To address this issue and to still be able to identify the causal e¤ect of Jewish demography in 1500 on current
economic development, I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach based on an historical event: the expulsion of
the Jews from the Kingdom of Naples between 1504 and 1541. I rely on two assumptions.
The rst assumption is that the expulsion was exogenous, meaning that no unobservables responsible for
the expulsion a¤ect current economic outcomes. This assumption may be violated if this event reected, for
example, a more intolerant local attitude toward diversity or usury. However, this is not the case. The expulsion
was the Monte di Pietà di Roma, founded by a papal bull in 1539 in the aftermath of the sack of Rome in 1527 and the famine
of 1538. The rebuilding e¤ort drained the city of credit capital and increased the interest rates charged by Jewish moneylenders.
In response, Pope Paul III issued a bull establishing the Monte di Pietà di Roma, which was placed under the protection of the
Franciscan Order. Another Italian bank that participated in the development of what became Banca di Roma is the Banco di Santo
Spirito, which was created in 1605 to raise funds for the charitable operations of the Arch-hospital Santo Spirito.
29The "Compagnia della Fede Cattolica di San Paolo" was created in 1563 after Piedmont countered the invasion of Phillip II of
Spain. The long war had aggravated an already di¢ cult economic situation, increasing famine and poverty in the city of Torino,
and the initial aim of the Compagnia was to centralize the collection and distribution of alms. In 1579, with the formal intent of
combating Jewish moneylenders, the Compagnia created a Monte di Pietà, which has operated uninterrupted (with an exception
of less than 10 years during the Napoleonic domination of Piedmont) to the present day.
30For example, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena was founded in 1473 as a Monte di Pietà and is currently the third-largest Italian
bank by capitalization. Banca Carige is the successor to the Monte di Pietà di Genova. Banca Carimonte, which recently joined
the Unicredit group, is the product of aggregating four ancient Monti (Ravenna, 1491; Bologna, 1473; Savignano, 1579; Cesena,
1487) with the Cassa di Risparmio di Cesena. Unibanca was created by the subsequent merger of several Monti (Lugo, 1546; Massa
Lombarda, 1572; Faenza, 1491) with the Cassa di Risparmio di Faenza, which was part of the Monte di Faenza before it became a
separate entity in 1891. Other examples of modern Italian banks that track their origins to the experience of the Monti di Pietà
are Banca del Monte di Lucca (1516), Banca Monte Parma (1488), and Banca del Monte di Lombardia (from the merger of the
Monti of Milano, 1483; Mantova, 1484; Cremona, 1490; Monza, 1492; Pavia, 1493; and Bergamo, 1557). Figure A.3 in the online
appendix depicts the main bank branches in the city of Bologna today. The historic building still bears the legend, "Monte di Pietà
di Bologna", and its founding year, 1473.
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originated from the lack of heir to the throne when the king of Naples, Frederick IV, died in 1503. The territories
of the Kingdom of Naples were therefore divided between the two strongest European monarchies: France and
Spain. One year later, they all fell to the Spanish crown, which had conquered two other large municipalities in
Central Italy. At that point, the edict expelling the Jews, which had been promulgated in Spain in 1492, was
extended to these new Spanish territories in Italy. The edict was strongly opposed by the local aristocracy31
and resulted in riots and protests in several cities. The edict may thus be reasonably concluded to solely reect
the attitude of the Spanish crown toward the Jews, rather than local sentiments.
The second assumption is that those unobservables that systematically drove Jewish communities toward
certain cities and that a¤ect local current economic development di¤er between those territories that fell under
the Spanish crown in 1504 and those that did not.
Given the two assumptions above, a useful framework for studying the long-term e¤ect of Jewish commu-
nities during the Italian Renaissance on current economic development is provided by the matrix described in
Table 3, which divides Italian cities along two dimensions: (1) whether they hosted a Jewish community in
1500 and (2) whether they belonged to a territory where Jews were still allowed to reside in 1504. Y measures
the current per-capita income in each cell. A simple test for the magnitude of the long-term e¤ect of hosting
a Jewish community can therefore be conducted by examining whether the di¤erence in per-capita income
between cities that hosted Jewish communities in 1500 and cities that did not is higher in regions in which
Jews were allowed to reside in 1504 compared with regions in which they were expelled as a consequence of the
Spanish domination, or:
(Y11   Y10)  (Y01   Y00)
As is customary in the literature, I express the di¤erence-in-di¤erence results in a regression format:
log Yi = 1Stayi + 2J
1500
i + 3J
1500
i  Stayi +X 0i + 1i (5)
where Stayi is a dummy that identies territories in which Jews were allowed to stay (i.e., that did not belong
to the Kingdom of Naples). Table 4 reports the results. In column 1, the only controls are the usual set of
geographical characteristics and the province dummies.
There are two striking results.
First, the impact of the presence of a Jewish community in 1500 in the Kingdom of Naples on current per-
31For example Lagumina and Lagumina (1992) report on two petitions, one drafted and signed by high-ranking o¢ cials and
members of the nobility, and the other from the jurats of Palermo (elected representatives) that were addressed to the king in
protest to the expulsion. See also Simonsohn (2006) (pp. 4739-4744) and Ingram (2009).
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capita income (i.e. the estimated value of 2) is not signicant, either economically or statistically. In the once
Spanish-dominated territories, from which Jews were expelled, no current di¤erence in per-capita income exists
between cities that formerly hosted Jewish communities and cities that did not. Thus, whatever unobservable
led the Jews to establish communities in particular cities in 1500 does not seem to a¤ect the current economic
development of these cities.
Second, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level and is very
large. Having a Jewish community in 1500, in a region from which the Jews were not subsequently expelled, is
associated with a nearly 11 percent higher income today. Thus, the presence of a Jewish community in 1500,
in those areas from which the Jews had not been expelled, has surprisingly signicant long-term e¤ects on the
economic development of Italian municipalities.
In column 2, I perform a simple placebo test to conrm that the e¤ect of Jewish demography on local
economic development results from the creation of the Monti di Pietà that the Jewish community spurred.
Specically, I include a triple interaction among a dummy that identies those cities that developed a Monte
di Pietà in the rst century of their activity and the variables J1500i and Stayi. This triple interaction is
positive and signicant, while, in this specication, the interaction J1500i Stayi becomes two times smaller and
statistically insignicant. Thus, the presence of a Jewish community in territories that were not part of the
Kingdom of Naples only a¤ected current per-capita income in those cities in which a Monte was created.
The following columns report the results of a series robustness checks on the benchmark specication. In
particular, the results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of the area of the municipality (column 3) and
a dummy that identies regional administrative capitals (column 4). In column 5, I rerun the regression but
control for the size of the urban population in 1300 and 1400. Cities that were larger during the Renaissance
could be more economically developed today because they inherited higher levels of human and social capital
(see Guiso et al. (2008) and Percoco (2009)). This factor could bias my results if the Jewish communities
in the Kingdom of Naples were concentrated in smaller or larger cities relative to other Jewish communities.
The ancient urban population is clearly an endogenous regressor in equation 5: certain omitted characteristics
may both have a¤ected the urban population ve centuries ago and drive per-capita income today. However,
the very marginal e¤ect of the inclusion of the coe¢ cient on the interaction term suggests that my results are
not driven by the distribution of the urban population during the Renaissance. Furthermore, adding several
controls for the quality of a municipalitys human capital (i.e., the illiteracy rate and percentages of residents
that completed primary, secondary, and undergraduate education) does not substantially a¤ect the estimates
(column 6).
As explained in the previous section, the Duchy of Milan also fell under Spanish domination in 1535, and in
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1597, Jews were also expelled from that region. In column 7, I exclude municipalities belonging to this duchy
in the sixteenth century from the sample. As expected, the estimate of the coe¢ cient on the interaction term
increases substantially (by approximately one-third)32.
Another possible concern is that the factors that led to the creation of a Jewish community may di¤er
between territories that subsequently fell under the Spanish crown and those that did not. While Jewish
communities in Central and Southern Italy trace their origins to the rst century CE, the Jews who settled
in Northern Italy did so much later. Therefore, the locational advantage that led the Jews to settle in certain
locations in the North may have been very di¤erent from the locational advantage that led them to settle
in the South. To address this concern, in column 8, I limit the analysis to Central Italy. Surprisingly, the
estimate of the coe¢ cient on the interaction term increases substantially. This result is likely obtained because
the expansion of the Monti di Pietà began in Central Italy, and Franciscan preachers focused their e¤orts
against Jewish usury in these regions. Nevertheless, the division of Italy into North/Central/South is a modern
conception. In Table 5, I repeat the di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis but focus on a sample of cities located
su¢ ciently near the border of the Kingdom of Naples. The rst column focuses on cities located within 100
kilometers of the border; the following columns extend the analysis to cities within 150, 250, 350, and 450
kilometers of the border. The results conrm the qualitative ndings in Table 4. Moreover, I cannot reject the
hypothesis (at the 5 percent signicance level) that the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is identical across
the ve di¤erent subsamples in the table.
Note, however, that the results in Tables 4 and 5 might only capture a lower bound of the true e¤ect of
Jewish demography during the Renaissance on economic development. First, conducting the analysis on cities
that had at least 5,000 inhabitants in 1861 might introduce a survival bias. If cities without Jewish communities
in 1500, which were not part of the Kingdom of Naples, remained relatively small because of the absence of
well-developed local banks, they might be excluded from the sample. Second, the average per-capita GDP
in the LLS might underestimate the per-capita GDP of a town, as urban and industrial centers tend to have
higher incomes than the surrounding countryside.
In sum, the presence of a Jewish community in 1500 is only associated with higher per-capita income in
territories in which Jews where not expelled as a consequence of the Spanish edict. This nding suggests
that it is not the characteristics of the cities in which the Jews chose to reside in 1500 but rather their
continuous presence in the fteenth and sixteenth centuries that a¤ects current local economic development.
More specically, according to these estimates, this continuous presence is currently responsible for an increase
32The rst six columns of Table 4 have been reproduced for the sample that excludes the Duchy of Milan. The qualitative results
are unchanged; however, in all cases, the estimates of the coe¢ cient on the interaction term are approximately one-third larger.
See Table A.1 in the online appendix.
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in per-capita income of between 11 and 19 percent. A common argument is that the expulsion of the Jews was
responsible for the long-term decline of European territories under the Spanish crown33 and the beginning of
the economic divergence between Northern and Southern Italy. The results above allow me to infer the extent
to which the current North-South gap in economic development is explained by this shock. According to the
most conservative estimates, if Jews had not been expelled from the Spanish territories, GDP would have been 7
percent higher in Southern Italy. Overall, the expulsion explains at least 10 percent of the income gap between
Northern and Southern Italy. I do not have reasonable theories to explain the remaining gap. However, these
numbers may (in fact, likely) underestimate the e¤ect of the expulsion. Because of temporary migration (due to
the mechanism of the condotta) in the sixteenth century, the Jewish communitiespositive e¤ects likely spilled
over into the neighboring towns, further contributing to the development of nancial institutions in Central
and Northern Italy.
5 E¤ects of Local Banks on Development
In the previous section, I showed that the continuous presence of a Jewish community during the sixteenth
century exerted substantial e¤ects on the economic development of Italian cities. The objective of this section
is to conrm the channels through which this e¤ect occurred by revealing two causal relationships: the impact
of the incorporation of a Monte di Pietà during the Renaissance on the development of the local banking system
and the impact of local banks on economic performance.
First, I establish the latter relationship by estimating, through two-stage least-squares (2SLS), the coe¢ cient
4 in equation 4, which captures the impact of increasing the availability of local credit on per-capita income
in contemporary Italian cities. A natural candidate for an instrument in this context is Jewish demography in
1500. Above, I argued that there are historical reasons to believe that Jewish communities in 1500 fostered the
development of local credit markets. I next argue that Jewish demography in 1500 is uncorrelated with the
error term in equation 4 (i.e. Cov(J1500i ; 4;i) = 0). To support this argument, I decompose the residual 4;i
into three components:  [ 1;1500];i,  [1500;2000];i and "i:
4;i = "i +  [1500;2000];i +  [ 1;1500];i
where "i represents exogenous shocks and measurement errors a¤ecting the per-capita income of city i;  [ 1;1500];i
is the set of unobserved features of city i that a¤ect current per-capita income and that were already in place be-
fore 1500; and  [1500;2000];i is the set of unobserved features of city i that a¤ect current per-capita income and that
33See, for example,Peri (1988) (chp. 13) and Epstein (1992) (p. 337) for Sicily, Kamen (1998) for Spain, and Ruiz-Martin (1949)
for Southern Italy.
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arose after 1500. The three su¢ cient conditions for the exclusion restriction to be valid are Cov(J1500i ; "i) = 0,
Cov(J1500i ;  [1500;2000];i) = 0 and Cov(J
1500
i ;  [ 1;1500];i) = 0.
Although the rst condition is valid by construction, the other two conditions require further discussion.
As a rst step, I argue that Cov(J1500i ;  [1500;2000];i) = 0. This assumption would be invalidated if Jewish
demography during the early Renaissance a¤ects current economic development in a manner that does not
result from its direct e¤ect on the development of local credit markets. Jews have traditionally displayed a
high level of literacy; moreover, historically, Jews were employed in occupations that were particularly skill-
intensive (Botticini and Eckstein (2005)). Thus, Jewish communities may persist until today and continue to
a¤ect the level of human capital in their cities, or they may have eventually disappeared, but not before they
transmitted their knowledge to the rest of the population, thereby contributing to the present level of human
capital. However, both cases seem implausible. First, the distribution of the Jewish population in Italy is well
documented to have changed completely over the last two centuries, and with three notable exceptions (Rome,
Florence, Venice), most of the ancient Jewish communities have disappeared or are insignicant in size34.
Second, Renaissance-era Jewish communities are unlikely to have contributed to the cultural, institutional, and
economic development of their cities (if not through their e¤ects on nancial development). From the beginning
of the sixteenth century through the end of the nineteenth century, Jews were segregated from the rest of the
population and nearly exclusively derived their livelihoods from moneylending. The Lateran Council forbade
Catholics from interacting with Jews for any purpose other than business. The Jews were forced to live in a
dedicated section of the city, the ghetto, that they were not allowed to leave during the night; during the day,
they were obliged to wear a distinctive badge to be easily recognizable by Catholics. They were excluded from
all professions (with the exception of medicine and moneylending), academia, and all public o¢ ces and were
not allowed to employ non-Jews in their pawnshops. The restrictions were strengthened in 1555 when the papal
bull Cum nimis absurdum35,which forbade the Jews from owning any real estate, rea¢ rmed the necessity
to segregate Jews from the Catholic population and forbade Catholics from working for Jews or receiving
treatment from Jewish doctors. The bull remained e¤ective until 1848 in Piedmont and 1870 in the rest of
Italy.
As the nal step in defending the exclusion restriction, I argue that Cov(J1500i ;  [ 1;1500];i) = 0. This
34Bonl writes that [between 1815 and 1938], the structure of the Jewish community changed radically. In 1840 there existed
about 70 organized communities, in 1938 only 23. [...] The distribution of the Jewish population also changed. Many small
rural communities disappeared, while medium-sized urban ones su¤ered through migration to the large centers. Some years later,
the Nazi persecutions in Italy during the Second Word War decimated Italian Jewry. Through deportations, conversion to other
religions, and emigration, in fewer than 5 years, Italy lost nearly half of its Jewish population.
35The rst two lines of the bull, Cum nimis absurdum et inconveniens existat ut iudaei, quos propria culpa perpetuae servituti
submisit, sub praetextu quod pietas christiana illos receptet et eorum cohabitationem sustineat [. . . ], can be translated as follows:
Since it is completely senseless and inappropriate to be in a situation where Christian piety allows the Jews (whose guilt all of
their own doing has condemned them to eternal slavery) access to our society and even to live among us [. . . ].
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condition would be violated if omitted variables both inuenced Jewish demography during the Renaissance
and drive current local economic development. However, as the previous section indicates, if any unobservable
is systematically correlated with the cities in which the Jews lived, it does not have any e¤ect on current per-
capita income: in areas from which Jews were expelled during the sixteenth century, no di¤erences in per-capita
income exist today between cities that hosted Jewish communities and those that did not36.
Having discussed the validity of my instruments, I move on to the 2SLS estimates of equation 4. I restrict
the analysis to cities that did not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. The results are presented in Table
6. When I simply regress log income per capita on log credit availability to the private sector, the estimates
of 4 are positive and highly signicant: an increase in credit availability of 1 percent generates an increase
in local GDP by 0.22 percent. As expected, the rst-stage regression (reported in Panel B) indicates that the
presence of a Jewish community in 1500 has a positive and signicant e¤ect on current credit availability. In
column 2, I add province xed e¤ects. Surprisingly, their impact on the elasticity of interest is very low (it
increases from 0.22 to 026).
Column 3 reports the benchmark specications: the controls comprise the set of geographical characteristics
and the province dummies. The estimates for 4 are unchanged, and the F-test for the excluded instrument is
41.3, suggesting that these estimates do not su¤er from a weak instrument problem.
In the following three columns, I repeat the exercise but use not only the presence of a Jewish community
in 1500 but also its size as instruments. More specically, the availability of credit is treated as endogenous
and modeled as follows:
logFi = 1J
S
i + 2J
M
i + 3J
L
i +X
0
i + i (6)
where JSi , J
M
i and J
L
i indicate the presence of a small, medium and large community in 1500, respectively.
Interestingly, the rst-stage regressions in Panel B show that not only the presence of a Jewish community but
also its size a¤ects the current credit-to-GDP ratio: the larger the Jewish community is, the greater current
credit availability is. Note that the results of the second-stage regression are nearly una¤ected, although this
specication raises a possible concern: the size of the Jewish community in 1500 may reect a locational
advantage that continues to a¤ect income (I am only able to argue that the presence of the community does
not).
Finally, in the last three columns, I use branch density instead of the credit-to-GDP ratio as a measure of
local banking development. The results are surprising. The e¤ect of banks on income is much larger than that
36Table A.2, in the online appendix, highlights that in areas from which Jews were expelled in 1504, no di¤erences in credit
availability to the private sector exist today (while large di¤erences persist in areas from which Jews had not been expelled).
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in any other previous result: an increase in branch density of 1 percent increases per-capita GDP by 0.7-1.2
percent, depending on the econometric specication. This nding seems to validate the view that banks a¤ect
economic performance through the provision of not only credit but also a greater variety of services.
Table 7 reports the results of a set of robustness checks. The previous results are unchanged when I control
for the size of the municipality (columns 1 and 4) and whether the city is the capital of its region (columns 2 and
5). In columns 3 and 6, I add the populations of the city in 1300 and 1400 to the covariates. This robustness
check is motivated by the potential for the presence of a Jewish community during the Renaissance to serve as a
proxy for the size of the city in this period. The estimates of the elasticity of per-capita income with respect to
local banking development decline by one-fourth (from 0.24 to 0.19 when I use credit availability and from 1.2
to 0.9 when I use branch density). Columns 7 and 8 conrm the qualitative results when I exclude cities that
were part of the Duchy of Milan from the sample (from which Jews were expelled at the end of the sixteenth
century)37.
In the last four columns of Table 7, I restrict the sample to two more homogenous sets of cities: columns 9
and 10 restrict the analysis to Central Italy, while columns 11 and 12 focus on cities that were under the Papal
States. In Table 8, I restrict the sample to cities near the border of the Kingdom of Naples. In particular, I only
consider cities located at a distance of no more than 100, 150, 250, 350, or 450 kilometers from the border. In
all these subsamples, the e¤ect of local banks on current per-capita income is positive and signicant, although
it generally seems to be more pronounced in Central Italy.
The second objective of this section is to establish the causal e¤ect of the incorporation of a Monte di Pietà
during the Renaissance on Italian banks today. Table 9 reports 2SLS estimates of equation 3. In column 1, the
only covariates are the set of geographical characteristics and the province dummies. There are two striking
results. First, there is extraordinary persistence in the level of local banking development. The presence of a
Monte di Pietà during the sixteenth century increases the current availability of credit to the private sector (in
terms of GDP) by more than one hundred percent. Second, in line with equations (1) and (2), the presence
of a Jewish community in 1500 is a strong predictor of the locations of the Monti two centuries later. Having
a Jewish community is associated with an increase in the probability of hosting a Monte di Pietà of nearly 40
percent. The qualitative results are conrmed in column 2, where I add the estimated population in 1300 and
1400 to the regressors, although the estimate of the persistence parameter, 3, declines by one-third.
In columns 3 and 4, I repeat the analysis but use current branch density as the dependent variable. The
point estimates for 3 are approximately one-fth the size of those in previous columns. This result seems
37Table 6 has been reproduced for the sample that excludes the Duchy of Milan. The qualitative results are nearly unchanged
(the estimates for the elasticity of per-capita income with respect to local banking development are slightly larger). See Table A.3
in the online appendix.
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to suggest that the presence of a Monte di Pietà increases not only the number of local banks but also their
average size (as measured by the credit that they provide). Finally, in columns 5 and 6, I exclude the Duchy
of Milan from the sample, while in columns 7 and 8, I restrict the analysis to Central Italy. The results are
qualitatively unchanged.
In sum, the empirical evidence for the long-term persistence of local banking institutions is robust. The data
analysis in this section conrms that the presence of a Jewish community ve centuries ago fostered current
local banking development through its e¤ect on the development of the Monti di Pietà. Moreover, the 2SLS
results indicate that local banking development has a signicant e¤ect on economic performance. This e¤ect is
robust to the use of di¤erent measures for banking development, di¤erent samples, and di¤erent econometric
specications, although it is larger when the analysis is restricted to Central Italy.
6 Financial Development and Technology
The most successful explanation of the mechanisms through which well-functioning banks a¤ect economic
development has been suggested by the Shumpeterian growth literature, which stresses the importance of
banks for aggregate productivity. According to this body of literature, nancial intermediaries are able to
identify the more innovative entrepreneurs and more productive production processes and to provide them with
the necessary purchasing power by diverting the means of production from their previous uses. By selecting the
more promising investments within a rm and across di¤erent rms, well-functioning banks are able to foster
aggregate productivity and, through this channel, economic development.
To test the Shumpeterian hypothesis, I use a detailed dataset on Italian rms in the manufacturing sector.
First, I infer the productivity of each rm in the sample as the residual of an estimated production function.
Then, I compute a measure of the aggregate productivity in Italian cities that aggregates the productivity of
the local rms. Finally, I study how local banks a¤ect this productivity measure.
Assume that the (gross) production function in industry j is Cobb-Douglas:
log Yfit = "
j
L logLfit + "
j
K logKfit + "
j
M logMfit + it + jt + f + !fit (7)
where Yfit denotes the total sales of rm f in city i, Lfit, Kfit and Mfit are the rms production factors, it
is a city-specic component of productivity, jt is an industry-specic common component of productivity, f
is a time-invariant, rm-level component, and !fit is an idiosyncratic component. I estimate equation 7 (at
the 3-digit industry level) by using several methodologies: OLS, Di¤erence OLS, Olley and Pakes, Di¤erence
GMM, and System GMM. The advantages and disadvantages of each choice are well known, although there
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is no consensus on which estimator should be used38. The results in this section are robust to these di¤erent
methodologies.
Having obtained the estimates of the output elasticity to each production factor, I recover the total factor
productivity of rm f, tfi, as follows:
log tfi  log Yfi   b"jL logLfi   b"jK logKfi   b"jM logMfi (8)
Finally, I compute a measure of the aggregate productivity of city i as a weighted average of the productivity
of the rms operating within the city:
log Ti 
X
f2i
wfi log tfi (9)
where the weights are wfi  V Af=
P
f2i V Af and V Af is the value added produced by rm f. Using Jewish
demography in 1500 as an instrument, I then regress aggregate productivity on the two measures of local
banking development:
log Ti = T logFi +X
0
iT + 1;i (10)
The results are reported in the rst two columns of Table 10. The only controls are the usual province xed
e¤ects and the geomorphological characteristics. Local credit availability and branch density have a positive
and signicant e¤ect on aggregate productivity in Italian municipalities. Specically, an increase in the credit-
to-GDP ratio of 1 percent increases local aggregate productivity by 0.05 percent, while the same increase in
branch density has a much larger e¤ect of approximately 0.5 percent.
Most of the theoretical literature focuses on two channels through which banks could a¤ect rm productivity.
First, banks produce ex ante information on possible investments; this implies a reallocation of capital toward
more productive rms. Second, banks monitor investments ex post and exert pressure on corporate governance;
this implies a general increase in the productivity of rms. To distinguish between these two channels, it is
helpful to decompose productivity gures in Italian cities into two components, as suggested by Olley and Pakes
(1996):
38A fundamental estimation problem concerns the endogeneity of the input variables, which are likely to be correlated with both
f and !fit. Correlation with !fit may reect either a simultaneity of input choices or measurement errors. Given the brief
duration of the panel, eliminating f through a within transformation is not the appropriate strategy. An approach involving
di¤erencing (7) using the di¤erence GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)) is a possibility, but appropriately lagged values of
the regressors may be poor instruments if the inputs are very persistent. Using the GMM System estimator (Blundell and Bond
(1998) and Blundell and Bond (2000)) is likely a better option. An alternative approach is proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).
This estimator addresses the simultaneity (and selection) problem by using rm investment as a proxy for unobserved productivity
and only requires the presence of one unobserved state variable at the rm level and monotonicity in the investment function. A
recent survey of di¤erent methodologies to estimate the production function is provided by Van-Beveren (2010).
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log Ti;t =
X
f2i
 log tfitwfit + log tit (11)
where:
 log tfit  log tfit   log tfit and wfit  wfit   wit
and:
log tit 
X
f2i
log tfit and wit 
X
f2i
wfit
The rst term in equation 11 represents the sample covariance between productivity and value added. The
larger this covariance is, the higher the share of value added that goes to more productive rms and the higher
city is productivity will be. The second term is the unweighted average of rm-level productivity gures.
Generally, the rst term is interpreted as a measure of the economys e¤ectiveness in reallocating inputs toward
more productive rms, while the second term is considered a valid measure of aggregate technology.
Columns 3-4 and columns 5-6 in Table 10 present 2SLS estimates for the equations:
Re alli = R logFi +X
0
iR + 2;i (12)
log ti = U logFi +X
0
iU + 3;i (13)
respectively, where Re alli 
X
f2i
 log tfitwfit andXi is the usual set of covariates. Local banking development
has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on the variations in aggregate productivity that are due to the
reallocation of resources toward more e¢ cient rms. Ceteris paribus, a 1 percent increase in credit availability
increases the reallocation term by 0.035 percent; again, the e¤ect of branch density is much larger, as a 1 percent
increase in branch density increases the reallocation term by 0.3 percent. Over two-thirds of the e¤ect of local
banks on aggregate productivity is explained by their e¤ects on the reallocation of resources, while less than
one-third is explained by their e¤ects on the unweighted average rm productivity gures. This nding seems
to validate the original Schumpeterian view that banks a¤ect growth by identifying the best entrepreneurs and
diverting resources to nance their innovations.
The existence of cities with high banking development may still generate a negative externality for areas
lacking such development, and thus, the previous results may overstate the e¤ect of banking on aggregate
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productivity and, through this channel, on economic development. Moreover, this possibility may be greater
in industries in which rms can easily relocate than in other industries. To exclude this possibility, in Table
11, I restrict the sample to rms active in the sector in which exibility in geographical location is the lowest:
construction. The results are nearly unchanged with respect to those in the previous table: this nding suggests
that the mobility of rms is not crucial in explaining the e¤ects of local banks on productivity.
In conclusion, local banking development has strong, positive e¤ects on city-level aggregate productivity.
Moreover, the e¤ects of banks on aggregate productivity appear to operate by reallocating resources toward more
productive rms rather than by increasing the average productivity of rms. This nding seems to validate
theories stressing the importance of the role of the banks in exploiting ex ante information on investment
opportunities to select the more promising investments.
7 Conclusion
Numerous historiographic accounts conjecture that Jewish communities in Italy played an important role in
fostering the development of local banks and, through this channel, the economic development of a large number
of Italian cities. In particular, a fascinating hypothesis presented in this stream of literature is that the decline
of Southern Italy began with the expulsion of the Jews by the Spanish crown and its subsequent e¤ects on
local credit markets. This conjecture, which has not been formally tested, is interesting for two reasons: it
presupposes extraordinary persistence in the level of local banking development, and it imputes a pivotal role
to local banks in the development of local economies.
My results conrm that the level of local banking development during the Renaissance (proxied by the
presence of a Monte di Pietà or a Jewish pawnshop) had strong causal e¤ects on the current availability of
credit in Italian municipalities. Moreover, evidence indicates that local banks have had an important e¤ect on
current income. In particular, well-functioning banks are better able to reallocate resources toward the most
productive rms and, in this way, increase aggregate productivity and income. Finally, my empirical estimates
suggest that the expulsion of Jews from the Spanish territories in Italy is responsible for a signicant portion
of the income gap between Northern and Southern Italy.
The Monti di Pietà were originally intended to provide small loans to the poor, and their role in Italian
society during the Renaissance was not markedly di¤erent from that of modern micronance in developing
countries. My results conrm that, at least in the past, microcredit-like institutions were able to foster nancial
development and, through this channel, economic development in the long run.
However, this work lacks a rigorous analysis of the mechanisms that are responsible for the persistence in
the level of local banking development. I can speculate that one of the primary reasons for this persistence
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is that a banks major asset is its reputation, which generally appreciates over time, but further research is
needed in this direction. Moreover, although I provide evidence of a particular channel through which local
banks may a¤ect income, Schumpeterian growth, other channels may be operating simultaneously.
While using Italy as a natural laboratory to study the e¤ects of local banks on economic development
provides several advantages, a study based on information from a single country may lack external validity. In
particular, in countries characterized by more developed stock markets, local banks might not be as important
in fostering economic development because other means of nancing are available. I address this concern
in Table A.4 in the online appendix by examining how stock market capitalization compares with the total
credit provided to privates by the banking sector in all upper-middle income countries for which these data
are available. The ratio of these two quantities is relatively low for Italy but is not particularly di¤erent from
the sample median; the ratio for Italy is very similar to that for countries such as Germany, China, Spain, and
Japan but less than a fourth of that for Russia and the US. These comparisons should provide condence that
my results have external validity beyond Italy, at least to a large number of developed economies39.
My ndings do not imply that contemporary banking institutions are predetermined by local historical
events and that they cannot be changed. This paper belongs to a substantial body of empirical literature on
the long-term e¤ects of historical events, which has occasionally been criticized for being defeatist40. This is not
my point of view. I emphasize Jewish demography as one of the many factors a¤ecting Italian local nancial
institutions; because it is arguably exogenous, it is useful as an instrument for isolating the e¤ects of banks on
development. My interpretation of the results of this paper is that improvements in nancial institutions may
substantially benet the economic environment. However, as is common in this stream of literature, this paper
is silent on the amount of time required for high-quality institutions to a¤ect development and the persistence
of this e¤ect over time. Both points are clearly relevant for both economists and policy makers and are part of
my future research agenda.
39As further condence in the results, Italy comprises regions that are characterized by very di¤erent historical backgrounds and
degrees of economic development. The e¤ects of local banks on economic development have been tested on di¤erent subsamples in
Italy, excluding the Kingdom of Naples (see, for instance, Tables 7 and 8). At the 5 percent condence level, I cannot rule out the
possibility that the e¤ect is uniform across all the subsamples. Further, in an unreported table, all regressions in the paper were
replicated for the years 2000 and 2001, and the ndings are unchanged.
40For instance, The-Economist (2011) dismisses the argument advanced by Putnam (1993) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2008) that the level of social capital in Italian municipalities has been highly persistent over time and that it originates from the
types of government in the Middle Ages by arguing that it quickly becomes defeatist. If Italys problems really date back to the
political vacuum created by the collapse of the Roman Empire [. . . ], then perhaps it is time to give up and sip Campari soda on
the Amal coast instead.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Samples Used in Estimation
PANEL A City level data (historical)
Standard
Mean Median Deviation Min Max N
Small Jewish Community 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 360
Medium Jewish Community 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 360
Large Jewish Community 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 360
Monte di Pietà (1470-1570) 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 360
Jewish Pawnshop 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 360
Population 1300 6.06 0.00 13.98 0.00 150.00 360
Population 1400 2.72 0.00 8.99 0.00 100.00 360
PANEL B City level data
Standard
Mean Median Deviation Min Max N
GDP per Capita 17.47 17.48 6.01 5.58 36.75 720
Credit /GDP 0.71 0.57 0.61 0.02 4.85 720
Branches /Population 0.00051 0.00048 0.00025 0.00008 0.00128 720
Altimetry Min 95.49 43.50 119.97 -3.00 584.00 720
Altimetry Max 644.55 485.50 559.35 3.00 2,635.00 720
Altimetry Average 218.37 144.50 207.67 0.00 1,049.00 720
Seismicity 2.61 2.00 0.96 1.00 4.00 720
Sea 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 720
Close to Sea 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 720
river 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 720
Region Capital 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 720
City Area 126.66 93.00 128.79 2.00 1,499.00 720
Illiterate 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09 720
Primary Education 0.25 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.34 720
Secondary Education 0.29 0.29 0.03 0.19 0.39 720
Upper-Secondary Education 0.26 0.26 0.04 0.15 0.37 720
Tertiary Education 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.18 720
PANEL C Firm level data: Amadeus database
Standard
Mean Median Deviation Min Max N
Sales 15900 3530 99700 13 6400000 92316
Net Value of Capital 3120 495 22500 1 2010000 92316
Wages 2230 585 11400 1 619000 92316
Cost of Intermediates 12200 2570 83000 11 6000000 92316
Employees 71.03 24.00 310.94 1 18100 76301
Panel A reports statistics on historical data. The sample is limited to the towns in Italy (excluding the islands) that had a
population of at least 5000 people in 1861. Data on the size of Jewish demography refer to 1500 (source: Milano (1963)). Data on
the presence in the municipality of a Monte di Pietà or a Jewish pawnshops refer to the years 1470-1570 (source: Montanari (1999)
and Meneghin (1986)). Historical data on urban populations are expressed in thousands (source: Malanima (1998)). In Panel
B, "GDP per Capita" is the per-capita value added in the "local labor system" to which the municipality belongs, expressed in
thousands of euros (source: INSTAT). "Credit/GDP" is the ratio of claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the municipality
(source: Bank of Italy). "Branches/Population" is the ratio of the number of bank branches to residents (source: Bank of Italy).
Altimetry is expressed in meters (source: ISTAT). "Sea" is a dummy that identies cities that are located on the coast; "Close to
Sea" is a dummy that identies cities that are less than 5 miles from the sea; and "River" is a dummy that identies cities that
are crossed by a major river. "Region Capital" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the city is the capital of its region (year
2002). "City Area" is the extension of the municipality in square meters (year 1991). Panel C reports statistics for the Amadeus
rm-level data in the year 2000. "Sales", "Net value of capital", and "Wages" are expressed in thousands of euros.
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Table 2: Long-term persistence
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Jewish Pawnshop Monte di Pietà Credit/GDP Branch Density LGDP
JEW 0.0696 0.0597* 0.349*** 0.267***
(small) (0.0605) (0.0472) (0.0825) (0.0706)
JEW 0.0344 -0.0146 0.550*** 0.494***
(medium) (0.0707) (0.0658) (0.0843) (0.0760)
JEW 0.116 0.129 0.376*** 0.340***
(large) (0.118) (0.114) (0.134) (0.0943)
Jewish 0.527*** 0.492***
Pawnshop (0.0663) (0.0852)
Monte di 0.434*** 0.489*** 0.187*** 0.108***
Pietà (0.0684) (0.0660) (0.0361) (0.0329)
Credit 0.103***
/GDP (0.0156)
Branch 0.233***
Density (0.0393)
PROV. D. NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO NO
YEAR D. NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
r2 0.0157 0.0174 0.178 0.188 0.272 0.223 0.120 0.144 0.0795 0.0393 0.103 0.131
N 190 190 170 170 170 170 336 336 340 340 336 340
SAMPLE Kingdom of Italy excluding
Naples Kingdom of Naples
The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is municipality in columns 1-6 and municipality-year in columns 7-12.
Jewish Pawnshop is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the municipality hosted at least one Jewish pawnshop between 1470
and 1570. JEW is a dummy that identies those municipalities that hosted any kind of Jewish community in 1500. JEW(small),
JEW(medium) and JEW(large) are dummy variables equal to one if the municipality hosted respectively a small, a medium or a
large Jewish community in 1500. Monte di Pietà is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the municipality hosted at least one
Monte di Pietà between 1470 and 1570. Estimates in columns 7-12 refers to the years 2002-2003. Credit/GDP is the log ratio of
claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the municipality; Branch Density is the log ratio of the number of bank branches
to total residents in the municipality; LGDP is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the municipality
belongs. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
are two-way clustered (municipality and year). *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10
percent.
Table 3: Di¤erence in di¤erence
Jewish community in 1500
No Yes
STAY in 1504 No Y00 Y01
Yes Y10 Y11
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Table 4: Jewish communities in the Renaissance and current economic development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP
JEW 0.0271 0.0267 0.00476 0.00992 0.0104 0.00830 0.0283 0.0238
(0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0299) (0.0294) (0.0297) (0.0269) (0.0302) (0.0312)
JEW*STAY 0.106*** 0.0526 0.112*** 0.0836** 0.0651* 0.0846** 0.136*** 0.170***
(0.0395) (0.05) (0.0381) (0.0372) (0.0385) (0.0372) (0.0419) (0.0533)
JEW*STAY*MONTE 0.0789**
(0.0402)
STAY 0.0931** 0.129*** 0.0846* 0.121** 0.111** 0.138** 0.0751* 0.100**
(0.0418) (0.0498) (0.0448) (0.0409) (0.0446) (0.0616) (0.0422) (0.0485)
AREA 0.000307***
(0.0000834)
CAPITAL 0.298**
(0.0326)
POP1300 0.00384**
(0.00156)
POP1400 -0.000414
(0.00263)
GEO. CHARACT. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCE DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
EDUCATION NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO
r2 0.115 0.119 0.132 0.168 0.142 0.287 0.125 0.391
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 660 160
Sample Italy Italy excluding Central
Duchy of Milan Italy
The table reports OLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The left-hand side variable,
LGDP is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the municipality belongs. JEW is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the municipality hosted a Jewish community in 1500. STAY is a dummy that is equal to one if the municipality
did not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. MONTE is a dummy that is equal to one if the municipality hosted a Monte
di Pietà between 1470 and 1570. AREA is the extension of the municipality in square meters (data refer to 1991). CAPITAL is
a dummy that is equal to one if the city is the capital of the region. POP1300 and POP1400 are the estimated urban population
in the municipality in 1300 and in 1400, respectively. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992.
Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity (as reported by the Italian
National Statistical Institute) and three dummies for whether the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles),
or on a river. Controls for education are the illiteracy rate and the percentage of residents who completed primary, secondary and
undergraduate education. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are two-way clustered (municipality and year). *** signicant
at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
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Table 5: Jewish communities in the Renaissance and current economic development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP
JEW 0.0157 0.0592 0.0513 0.0308 0.0304
(0.0450) (0.0410) (0.0327) (0.0322) (0.0302)
JEW*STAY 0.189*** 0.157*** 0.151*** 0.188*** 0.146***
(0.0615) (0.0582) (0.0542) (0.0464) (0.0417)
STAY 0.0661 0.126** 0.0829 0.0359 0.0688
(0.0561) (0.0544) (0.0541) (0.0465) (0.0431)
GEO. CHARACT. YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCE DUM. YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES
r2 0.293 0.265 0.169 0.171 0.118
N 166 250 382 526 662
Sample Distance Border Kingdom of Naples<
100km 150km 250km 350km 450km
The table reports OLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The left-hand side variable,
LGDP is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the municipality belongs. JEW is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the municipality hosted a Jewish community in 1500. STAY is a dummy that is equal to one if the municipality
did not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992.
Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity, and three dummies for whether
the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
two-way clustered (municipality and year). *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10
percent.
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Table 6: Banks and local economic development
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGPD
Credit/GDP 0.223*** 0.256*** 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.259*** 0.262***
(0.0782) (0.0698) (0.0616) (0.0546) (0.0537) (0.0518)
Branch Density 0.680*** 1.254*** 1.236***
(0.251) (0.431) (0.381)
GEOGRAPHY NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
PROV. DUM. NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
archi2p 3.19e-3 4.41e-6 2.48e-7 6.07e-7 2.03e-9 3.19e-10 1.39e-3 6.47e-7 2.90e-9
sarganp 0.161 0.258 0.519
F 18.16 33.16 41.31 14.32 20.40 21.53 8.990 9.354 12.12
N 336 336 336 336 336 336 340 340 340
SAMPLE Italy excluding Kingdom of Naples
PANEL B
JEW 0.292*** 0.385*** 0.437*** 0.109*** 0.0889*** 0.102***
(0.0682) (0.0600) (0.0603) (0.0363) (0.0261) (0.0259)
JEWsmall 0.143* 0.244*** 0.286***
(0.0736) (0.0631) (0.0662)
JEWmedium 0.435*** 0.549*** 0.566***
(0.0952) (0.0798) (0.0782)
JEWlarge 0.686*** 0.729*** 0.729***
(0.122) (0.104) (0.101)
r2 0.0517 0.109 0.199 0.115 0.185 0.257 0.0260 0.0329 0.126
The table reports 2SLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The sample is limited to
municipalities that did not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. Panel A reports the second-stage estimates. The left hand
side variable, LGDP is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the municipality belongs. Credit/GDP is
the log ratio of claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the municipality, whereas Branch Density is the log ratio of the
number of bank branches to total residents in the municipality. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces
in 1992. Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity, and three dummies
for whether the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. Sarganp reports the p-value of
the Hansen-Sargan overidentication test. Archi2p reports the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin test (the null hypothesis is that the
coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero). F is the F statistics for weak identication. Panel B reports the
rst-stage estimates. To save space, only the coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments are reported. JEW is a dummy that identies
those municipalities that hosted a Jewish community in 1500. JEWsmall, JEWmedium and JEWlarge are dummy variables that
are equal to one if the municipality hosted a small, medium or large Jewish community, respectively, in 1500. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
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Table 7: Banks and local economic development (Robustness checks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP
Cred./GDP 0.244*** 0.211*** 0.188** 0.424** 0.366*** 0.181**
(0.0719) (0.0730) (0.0957) (0.117) (0.118) (0.0672)
Branch 1.158*** 1.050** 0.860** 1.407** 1.194*** 0.582**
Density (0.435) (0.409) (0.400) (0.441) (0.411) (0.176)
AREA 0.00466 0.0104
(0.0121) (0.000160)
CAPITAL 0.0124* 0.0134
(0.00690) (0.00855)
POP1300 0.0940 0.0204
(0.209) (0.272)
POP1400 0.0876 0.0287
(0.271) (0.363)
GEOGR. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROV. D. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR D. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 336 336 336 340 340 340 276 280 138 142 138 142
SAMPLE Italy excluding Italy Central Italy Papal
Kingdom of Naples exclud. Kingdom exclud. Kingdom State
of Naples of Naples
and Duchy Milan
The table reports 2SLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. Panel A reports the
second-stage estimates. The left-hand side variable, LGDP is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the
municipality belongs. Credit/GDP is the log ratio of claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the municipality, whereas
Branch Density is the log ratio of the number of bank branches to total residents in the municipality. AREA is the extension of
the municipality expressed in square meters (data refer to 1991). CAPITAL is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the city
is the capital of the region. POP1300 and POP1400 are the estimated urban population in the municipality in 1300 and 1400,
respectively. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992. Geographical variables are elevation of the
municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity, and three dummies for whether the city is located on the coast, close to
the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** signicant at less than 1 percent; **
signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
Table 8: Banks and local economic development (Robustness checks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP
Credit/GDP 0.186** 0.281*** 0.447*** 0.407*** 0.250***
(0.0774) (0.0974) (0.164) (0.0993) (0.0544)
Branch Density 0.598*** 0.895*** 1.731** 1.430*** 1.392***
(0.187) (0.261) (0.807) (0.438) (0.404)
GEOGRAPHY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROV. DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 80 104 152 200 278 84 108 156 204 282
SAMPLE Cities in Kingdom of Naples are excluded
Distance border Kingdom of Naples <
100 150 250 350 450 100 150 250 350 450
The table reports 2SLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The left-hand side variable,
LGDP is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the municipality belongs. Credit/GDP is the log ratio
of claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the municipality, whereas Branch Density is the log ratio of the number of
bank branches to total residents in the municipality. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992.
Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity, and three dummies for whether
the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
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Table 9: Long-term persistence of local nancial institutions
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Credit/GDP Branch Density Credit/GDP Branch Density Credit/GDP Branch Density
Monte di Pietà 1.250*** 0.828*** 0.281*** 0.240*** 1.211*** 0.376*** 1.480*** 0.489***
(0.199) (0.187) (0.0755) (0.0834) (0.280) (0.112) (0.438) (0.179)
POP1300 -0.00534 -0.00128
(0.00566) (0.00263)
POP1400 0.0191** 0.00302
(0.00769) (0.00360)
GEOGRAPHY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROV. DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
archi2p 4.13e-13 5.18e-6 1.54e-5 8.81e-6 135e-6 242e-4 2.73e-3 1.35e-3
F 42.39 38.07 48.70 43.55 21.52 27.98 10.59 14.90
N 336 336 340 340 276 280 138 142
SAMPLE Italy excluding Italy excluding Central Italy excluding
Kingdom of Naples Kingdom of Naples Kingdom of Naples
and Duchy of Milan
PANEL B
JEW 0.350*** 0.344*** 0.362** 0.354** 0.278*** 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.334**
(0.0476) (0.0493) (0.0460) (0.0475) (0.0527) (0.0506) (0.0824) (0.0771)
r2 0.170 0.279 0.176 0.285 0.131 0.134 0.202 0.214
The table 2SLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. Panel A reports the second-stage
estimates. The left hand side variables are Credit/GDP, the log ratio of claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the
municipality, and Branch Density, the log ratio of the number of bank branches to total residents in the municipality. Monte di
Pietà is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the municipality hosted a Monte di Pietà between 1470 and 1570. POP1300 and
POP1400 are the estimated urban population in the municipality in 1300 and 1400, respectively. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES
refers to the Italian provinces in 1992. Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average),
seismicity, and three dummies for whether the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river.
Archi2p reports the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin test (the null hypothesis is that the coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments are
jointly equal to zero). F is the F statistics for weak identication. Panel B reports the rst-stage estimates. To save space, only
the coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments are reported. JEW is a dummy that identies those municipalities that were hosting a
Jewish community in 1500. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5
percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
Table 10: Banks and local aggregate productivity - Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LTFP LTFP REALLOC REALLOC TECHNL TECHNL
Credit/GDP 0.0499*** 0.0351*** 0.0149**
(0.0149) (0.0133) (0.00664)
Branch Density 0.496* 0.302* 0.108*
(0.264) (0.178) (0.0595)
GEO. CHARACT. YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCE DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 220 220 220 220 220 220
SAMPLE Italy excluding Kingdom of Naples - Manufacturing rms
The table reports 2SLS estimates for the years 2000-2001. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The sample is limited to
municipalities that did not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. LTFP is a measure of aggregate productivity in the Local
Labor System (LLS) to which the municipality belongs. It is computed as the weighted average productivity of the rms operating
in manufacturing in the LLS, using as weights their shares of total value added. TECHN is the unweighted average of the rms?
productivities. REALLOC is the di¤erence between LTFP and TECHN. Credit/GDP is the log ratio of claims on nonnancial
private sector to GDP in the municipality and Branch Density is the log ratio of the number of bank branches to total residents in
the municipality. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992. Geographical variables are elevation of
the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity, and three dummies for whether the city is located on the coast, close
to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. The excluded instrument is a dummy variable that identies those municipalities
that were hosting a Jewish community in 1500. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are two-way clustered (municipality and
year). *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
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Table 11: Banks and local aggregate productivity - Construction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LTFP LTFP REALLOC REALLOC TECHNL TECHNL
Credit/GDP 0.0600*** 0.0348*** 0.0252***
(0.0170) (0.0124) (0.00772)
Branch Density 0.687** 0.483** 0.204*
(0.317) (0.221) (0.107)
GEO. CHARACT. YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCE DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 216 216 216 216 216 216
SAMPLE Italy excluding Kingdom of Naples - Firms operating in Construction
The table reports 2SLS estimates for the years 2000-2001. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The sample is limited to
municipalities that did not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. LTFP is a measure of aggregate productivity in the Local
Labor System (LLS) to which the municipality belongs. It is computed as the weighted average productivity of the rms operating
in construction in the LLS, using as weights their shares of total value added. TECHN is the unweighted average of the rms?
productivities. REALLOC is the di¤erence between LTFP and TECHN. Credit/GDP is the log ratio of claims on nonnancial
private sector to GDP in the municipality and Branch Density is the log ratio of the number of bank branches to total residents in
the municipality. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992. Geographical variables are elevation of
the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity, and three dummies for whether the city is located on the coast, close
to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. The excluded instrument is a dummy variable that identies those municipalities
that were hosting a Jewish community in 1500. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are two-way clustered (municipality and
year). *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
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Figure 1: Jewish Communities in 1500 A.D. (excluding the islands)
Figure 2: Italian Provinces and Macro-Regions (excluding the islands)
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A Appendix (not for publication)
Figure A.1: Italian States in 1500 A.D.
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Figure A.2: The sermon of Saint Giovanni da Capestrano, Historisches Museum.
Figure A.3: Monte di Pietà di Bologna
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Table A.1: Jewish communities in the Renaissance and current economic development
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP
JEW 0.0283 0.00743 0.0121 0.0133 0.0121
(0.0302) (0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0297) (0.0270)
JEW*STAY 0.136** 0.141** 0.116** 0.109** 0.125**
(0.0419) (0.0404) (0.0403) (0.0412) (0.0409)
STAY 0.0751* 0.0672 0.0998** 0.0869** 0.0941
(0.0422) (0.0444) (0.0412) (0.0440) (0.0572)
AREA 0.000287**
(0.0000833)
CAPITAL 0.279**
(0.0336)
POP1300 0.00280*
(0.00147)
POP1400 0.00126
(0.00273)
GEO. CHARACT. YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCE DUM. YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES
EDUCATION NO NO NO NO YES
r2 0.125 0.141 0.171 0.141 0.285
N 660 660 660 660 660
Sample Italy excluding
Duchy of Milan
The table reports OLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The left-hand side variable,
LGDP is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the municipality belongs. JEW is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the municipality hosted a Jewish community in 1500. STAY is a dummy equal to one if the municipality did
not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. AREA is the extension of the municipality expressed in square meters (data refer
to 1991). CAPITAL is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the city is the capital of the region. POP1300 and POP1400 are
the estimated urban population in the municipality in 1300 and 1400 respectively. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to
the Italian provinces in 1992. Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity,
and three dummies for whether the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. Controls for
education are the illiteracy rate and the percentage of residents who completed primary, secondary, and undergraduate education.
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are two-way clustered (municipality and year). *** signicant at less than 1 percent; **
signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10 percent.
Table A.2: Jewish communities in the Renaissance and current banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP
JEW 0.424** 0.109 -0.199 -0.472**
(0.0576) (0.192) (0.229) (0.143)
JEW*STAY 0.465* 0.576** 0.494*
(0.275) (0.275) (0.264)
STAY -0.0954 -0.436* -0.118
(0.339) (0.242) (0.237)
GEOGRAPHY YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES
PROV. DUM. YES YES YES YES
r2 0.139 0.140 0.347 0.468
N 674 674 154 80
Sample Italy Central Italy Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise
The table reports OLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is municipality-year. The left-hand side variable,
Credit/GDP, is the log ratio of claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the municipality. JEW is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the municipality hosted a Jewish community in 1500. STAY is a dummy that is equal to one if the municipality
did not belong to the Kingdom of Naples in 1503. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to the Italian provinces in 1992.
Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity, and three dummies for whether
the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
two-way clustered (municipality and year). *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10
percent.
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Table A.3: Banks and local economic development
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGDP LGPD
Credit/GDP 0.263** 0.428** 0.424** 0.279** 0.325** 0.354**
(0.0758) (0.141) (0.117) (0.0537) (0.0685) (0.0706)
Branch Density 0.719** 1.512** 1.407**
(0.217) (0.585) (0.441)
GEOGRAPHY NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
PROV. DUM. NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
YEAR DUM. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
sarganp 0.406 0.483 0.667
F 22.14 12.61 18.02 16.74 14.80 14.93 12.24 6.413 10.44
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 280 280 280
SAMPLE All Italian cities excluding Kingdom of Naples
and Duchy of Milan
The table 2SLS estimates for the years 2002-2003. The unit of observation is the municipality. Panel A reports the second-stage
estimates. The left-hand side variable, LGDP, is the log of GDP per capita in the "local labor system" to which the municipality
belongs. Credit/GDP is the log ratio of claims on nonnancial private sector to GDP in the municipality ,whereas Branch Density
is the log ratio of the number of bank branches over total residents in the municipality. The set of PROVINCE DUMMIES refers to
the Italian provinces in 1992. Geographical variables are elevation of the municipality (minimum, maximum, average), seismicity,
and three dummies for whether the city is located on the coast, close to the coast (less than 5 miles), or on a river. Sarganp
reports the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan overidentication test. Archi2p reports the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin test (the null
hypothesis is that the coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero). F is the F statistics for weak identication.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** signicant at less than 1 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; * signicant at 10
percent.
Table A.4: The size of the stock market relative to the banking sector in developed countries
Uruguay 0.02 Romania 0.70
Slovak Republic 0.16 Japan 0.72
Tunisia 0.22 Lithuania 0.73
Latvia 0.23 Korea, Rep. 0.76
Austria 0.25 Serbia 0.80
Portugal 0.28 Poland 0.82
New Zealand 0.31 Belgium 0.84
Ecuador 0.32 United Kingdom 0.88
Panama 0.34 Israel 0.89
Costa Rica 0.35 France 0.90
Macedonia 0.35 Greece 0.95
Ireland 0.40 Canada 0.99
Bulgaria 0.42 Colombia 1.04
Denmark 0.43 Australia 1.13
Germany 0.43 Luxemburg 1.21
Slovenia 0.45 Malaysia 1.21
Italy 0.50 Sweden 1.31
Estonia 0.52 Turkey 1.32
Iceland 0.56 Brazil 1.45
China 0.57 Switzerland 1.51
Thailand 0.57 Mexico 1.66
Mauritius 0.59 Finland 1.89
Hungary 0.61 Russia 2.06
Spain 0.63 Peru 2.08
Iran 0.63 Chile 2.08
Norway 0.64 United States 2.34
Czech Reublic 0.64 Argentina 2.75
Netherlands 0.66 South Africa 2.86
The table reports the average ratio between "Stock Market Capitalization to GDP" and "Bank private credit to GDP" between
2000 and 2010. Source: Global Financial Development Database, World Bank.
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